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ESSAY: THE ROMANCE OF NUREMBERG
AND THE TEASE OF MORAL JUSTICE
Thane Rosenbaum*
Moral justice is an illusion, a pipe dream of the pious, a fantasy of
the just, nothing more than a mere myth for the rest of us. It is a mirage
of civilized society, something we can envision but seldom receive, a
lure that is painfully alluring but ultimately ungraspable.
If moral justice existed-just for the sake of argument, as an
academic exercise and not to bring about madness through temptationit would feature courtrooms where citizens actually receive a day in
court, where voices are heard without disrespect and interruption, where
truth is discovered without the tidal wave of distortions and preclusions
that otherwise drown out any faithful recounting of what happened.
Findings of fact would ring true. Final judgments would produce a real
sense of closure. Legal relief would leave people feeling better.
Appeals would seem unappealing, if not unseemly, precisely because
the parties would end up reconciled rather than embittered. Adversaries
would be given an opportunity to encounter one another as human
beings, and possibly to hear words of contrition and regret, which might
restore moral balance to once severed relationships.
The experience of seeking the truth and speaking truths--of
granting people the voice to proclaim their grievances-would override
all other conceptions of justice. The self-limiting, self-sabotaging goals
of vindication, retribution, and revenge would cease to supply the legal
system's only arsenal of relief.
Moral justice provides victims with an opportunity to have their
stories told and the truth openly and publicly proclaimed and
memorialized. Judgments should never be sealed or silenced. Justice is
owed not only to the individual, but also to history, which receives the
benefit of our experience, applying the lessons we have learned and
avoiding the mistakes we have made. Moral justice takes into account
spiritual harms rather than those that are merely physical, material, and
quantifiable in nature. And moral justice requires that law--during
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special times of national crisis and soul-searching-must, on occasion,
deviate from the strict application and adherence to legal rules. If it
does not, the society that looks to that law for coherence will be forced
to live with the consequences of an unbearable outcome.
Moral justice, ultimately, feels just and makes sense. Judges
should continually ask themselves: Have we done what's right, and will
this decision contribute to a general sense of faith and confidence that
the legal system is a place of wisdom, fairness, and sound judgment?
The American legal system, sadly, neither asks these questions nor
is guided by these aspirations. Justice in America is always defined
narrowly and distilled into the slimmest of remedial options, the classic
core values of off-the-rack resolution-legal, but not necessarily moral.
Nothing could be more unimaginative and spiritually deflating. Those
who have been the victims of breached promises or injured by fumbling
professionals or damaged by charlatans and careless caretakers,
ultimately, through settlement negotiations, receive nothing but
monetary compensation for their losses. Those who find themselves as
victims of crimes watch as government prosecutors, bargaining pleas
with the dexterity of Las Vegas croupiers, ensure that the guilty are
incarcerated-even at the expense of truth. Punishment and retribution
is the endgame of legal justice. Restoration and repair, dignity and
respect, is not. The vast, vast majority of cases are never publicly aired
in a court of law.
Many things can be said about the Nuremberg Tribunals and their
legacy as a force for human rights and an inspiration for international
law. But what you do not hear much about is the way in which
Nuremberg, perhaps inadvertently, represented the essential values and
broad vision for moral justice. It is for this reason that Nuremberg, at
least to my mind, was one of the great heroic and romantic moments of
the twentieth century. It offered a glimpse as to what moral justice
might look like, implemented in response to the world's greatest known
atrocity, at a time when humanity had just failed so miserably.
Judgment at Nuremberg needed to be not only universal, but also
moral. It had to go beyond what the law would ordinarily provide. It
had to be as imaginative as it was meticulous. Given the enormity and
uniqueness of the crime, a legal apparatus needed to be devised that was
equal to the task, an international forum that would serve as a
monument to the proper evaluation and judgment of mass murder.
Everyone by now knows that Nuremberg was not inevitable.
Henry Morgenthau's vision for summary executions possessed its own
moral appeal. Indeed, an eye-for-an-eye, revenge-based response to
Nazi atrocities was not only arguably moral, but it is also offered an
appealingly swift, efficient resolution to a moral problem. The Nazis
had taken eleven million lives in roughly six years. Why should the
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world spend any time, or waste any resources, dispensing justice for
murderers who deserve nothing better than the immediacy of their own
deaths? The judgment against the Jews of Europe was unequivocally
merciless. Surely the Nazis and their accomplices shouldn't be given
their day in court. In fact, they shouldn't even receive the time of day.
Most people would have accepted summary executions as a legally
permissible and morally sustainable resolution to a gruesome episode in
world history. But the spirit of Nuremberg prevailed instead. The exact
opposite impulses, fueled by equally compelling moral imperatives,
won the day. Nuremberg was slow and time consuming, inconvenient
and resource-expending. It wasn't even local. The victors had to get on
a plane and judge their enemies on the road, among the rubble of a
bombed-out nation. And yet the moral argument that Nuremberg
represented changed the way the world forever regarded justice and
judgment, and gave rise to a new vision of moral responsibility among
nations and the broadening of the range of that responsibility.
True moral judgment is never swift. It must be undertaken with
great deliberation and thoughtfulness. It should never be decided
lightly, or performed without anguish. Most of all, it must not be
wasted. Moral judgment must be purposeful. It has to achieve more
than simply a quick fix. It has to be meaningful for those who seek
justice today, and those who will have to live with that justice, as well
as those who will need to know what is meant by justice in the future.
Killing Nazis in their tracks, while arguably moral, fails to achieve
so many other virtues, and fails to call attention to so many other values.
The decision to choose Nuremberg over the self-help model of frontier
justice, which many Americans appreciate and cherish in popular
culture, whether in narratives inspired by The Count of Monte Cristo, or
the vigilante, Rambo-styled retributions of Death Wish or Die Hard,
was a choice that ultimately favored the slower-paced dramas of moral
relief over the cheap thrills of a more conventional wild west ending.
Nuremberg forced the Germans to confront the full enormity and
vast evil of their crimes. Summary executions would have squandered
that opportunity-not just for the Germans, but for the world at large.
Nuremberg placed the world on notice that there are legal and moral
consequences to mass murder. Hit squads are efficient, but they are
silent. With assassinations, the world does not get to witness the
rogue's gallery of defendants, the voices of human testimony, and the
marshalling of incontestable proof. Nuremberg, through newsreel
footage, courtroom stenographers, and worldwide media coverage, gave
the Germans, and the world, a daily reminder of the grotesque
corruptions of humanity that were being undertaken in the name of the
Third Reich.
Moreover, the fact that the trials took place in Nuremberg, rather
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than in New York, London, Paris, or Moscow, located the trial at the
scene of the crime, once more placing the burden on the German people
to witness what was done under their watch. The same moral value was
achieved decades later in South Africa, with the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. And the failure to replicate this principle
happened more recently, in the tribunal that was convened in Tanzania
in order to judge and punish the genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda. Many
have observed that locating the trials in a different country, albeit one in
the same continent, ultimately prevents Rwandans from experiencing
the full emotional weight of national judgment and atonement.
Nuremberg stands for the proposition that, morally, these tribunals work
best when they are shoved in the face of the offending nation. The
moral choice of venue compels citizens who smugly cling to the thin
moral cloak of the "innocent" bystander to deal with the consequences
of the trial wherever they go and wherever they look.
Nuremberg was a bloodletting of documentary evidence,
meticulously introduced, chronicled, compiled, indexed, and recorded
for posterity. The piles of proof served the immediate purpose as trial
exhibits, but they also served as exhibits for history. Judgment matters,
and memory matters, too. It matters to future generations who need to
know what happened, and how it happened, and how the world
responded in its aftermath-essentially, how did the world ultimately
choose to judge the Nazis for their misdeeds? It wasn't merely enough
to name a new crime: the crime against humanity. The more important
question was: What set of remedies constituted judgment at Nuremberg,
and what kind of justice was deemed appropriate in the aftermath of
Auschwitz?
Such questions mattered not only to succeeding generations, but it
mattered even more so to the survivors of the Holocaust and to the dead.
What was done in their name, and in their memory, by the very nations
who were once so consciously complacent and indifferent to the
genocide of European Jewry? Establishing the guilt of the Nazis had to
serve the judicial ends of verifiable proof and also had to stand the test
of time. And as part of that proof, witnesses rounded out the storytelling, truth-seeking values that are the fabled lifeblood of trials. All of
this was being done on an international stage and in front of an
international audience. The narrative and truth-telling dimensions of
Nuremberg provided the late-arriving moral antidotes to all the silence,
suffering, and voicelessness that dominated the lives of those who had
been selected to die in the Final Solution. Nuremberg is the forefather
of all models of restorative justice and all efforts to promote
reconciliation and healing in the law.
None of these virtues would have been achieved, however, had the
Nazis swiftly succumbed to the hangman's noose. And yet, the moral
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justifications for the hangman's noose were not lost on the prosecutors
of Nuremberg. Henry Morgenthau may not have gotten his wish, but
neither was he ignored. Most of the defendants received a fitting and
final end. Nuremberg was a legal trial, but it was most definitely
framed in moral terms. The idea that the Nazis might somehow escape
judgment, slip through a loophole, duck under a technicality, was a
morally repugnant concept. And therefore the Nuremberg prosecution
team, led by Justice Robert Jackson, ensured that no such outcome
would rob these proceedings of its moral and symbolic authority.
And in doing so, even without acknowledging it, they implicitly
concluded, as a matter of moral justice, that atrocity is different.
Genocide cannot be prosecuted like any ordinary crime. It is, so
unmistakingly, out of the ordinary-a crime of extraordinary
proportion. And so, therefore, the context of the trial, and the moral
stakes of its outcome, could not be held hostage to the imperfections of
the constitutional process. A path to justice other than the purely legal
must reveal itself. Indeed, in the face of atrocity, it is the moral path
that ultimately influences the outcome.
If judged under a strict adherence to American constitutional
principles, the Nazis would have been able to present serious and
legitimate procedural defenses to the crimes attributed to them. In fact,
they did. After all, from the perspective of international law, the crime
of genocide did not exist at the time that the Nazis had perfected it, and
in so doing, raising the bar to a new level of monstrousness. And the
legal theory of criminal conspiracy, under which most Nazis were
prosecuted, was only an Anglo-American concept. Germans had never
before known this to be a crime. And yet, despite the fact that
prosecuting defendants for a crime that did not exist at the time of its
commission, and under a legal theory that did not exist under German
law, clearly violates the ex post facto clause of the American
Constitution, the Nuremberg prosecutors did not allow these
constitutional infirmities to compromise their mission.
Moreover, given the immense bureaucratic size of Germany's
killing apparatus, and the dispersion of so many murderous
responsibilities, it was difficult, if not impossible, to present proof
establishing the causal link between the acts of genocide and the
specific actions of many of the Nuremberg defendants. As every
American law student knows quite well, causation is the cornerstone of
the legal system's authority to render judgment. Without establishing a
proximate connection between the action and the harm-and the very
existence of an action-there is no crime, and there is no culpability.
But with the Germans, there was so much piecemeal, highly
fragmented, bureaucratized delegation that took place within and
between the killings. The necessary direct links, and the apparent mens
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rea, was neither present nor obvious in so many critical cases.
To avoid this apparent constitutional deficiency, Nuremberg
adopted the principle of organizational responsibility: mere membership
in the Nazi party, absent other concrete evidence of individualized guilt,
would nonetheless be sufficient to prosecute and judge. Associating
with unsavory characters, joining their party and taking part in their
ideological goose-stepping salutes, would be enough to establish guilt
and complicity.
But doesn't this violate the First Amendment's freedom of
association clause? Would the Constitution have allowed the same
practice in prosecuting the Ku Klux Klan here in the United States?
After a murder or lynching in Mississippi, could we have rounded up
everyone in the Deep South with a white hood inconveniently and
suspiciously stashed away in a closet, and held all Klan members
organizationally responsible for all of the murders committed during
Freedom Summer? The Red Scare, and the suspicion and prosecution
of communist sympathizers during the 1950s, presented this exact set of
legal problems. And most people, today at least, believe that the
Constitution had been grossly misapplied and ignored during those
volatile times of national soul-searching and paranoia.
Should it be that much different with Nazis? When it came to the
Nazis, jurisdictional concerns, retroactive punishments, standard
causation requirements, and freedom of association principles, were not
going to impede moral justice and the development of international law.
No one seemed to mind during Nuremberg that these constitutional
principles were being upended, and that a strict adherence to
constitutional safeguards seemingly did not make the trip to Germany.
Given the enormity of the Nazis' crimes and the moral implications of
acquitting them on procedural grounds, the Constitution, as a document,
apparently was deemed not fit for travel and therefore was left behind.
There was little ambivalence among the American prosecutors,
including a sitting Supreme Court justice, about applying this new path
to justice, one that looked legal but tilted in an entirely moral direction.
We have seen this blind-eye impulse before, even back home. The
treatment of pedophiles in America, after they are released from prison
and after having presumably served their debt to society, isn't exactly
consistent with constitutional safeguards. They remain subject to civil
commitment and stigmatized by statutes such as Megan's Law.
Obviously something other than the Constitution is controlling hereperhaps a moral statement of the community that our children are not
safe from these once convicted but now released defendants. And the
same was true of Nazis, and is largely still true of Nazis, in the guise of
concentration camp guards who illegally entered this country and
gained citizenship. They simply were not going to receive the same
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treatment under the law that we would ordinarily apply to ordinary
criminals-such as embezzlers, rapists, and those who rob convenience
stores.
Nuremberg clearly demonstrates that there are times when moral
responsibility supersedes legal duty. The Nazis were special and their
crimes were unique. In such circumstances, the law must recognize the
difference, and display a certain awe and humility in doing what's
morally just. An undeviating, legalistic obsession with the Constitution
simply does not work. The American Constitution, with its
presumptions of innocence, burdens of proof, governmental
proscriptions, and general protections of liberty-in the context of
genocide, and in the fresh light of Nuremberg's moral mandatenecessitated a new path to justice, one that was unapologetically and
unequivocally moral. There would be punishment, and there would be
judgment, but not at the expense of truth-seeking and story-telling,
historical justice and cultural memory, and the impact of such a
spectacle on the national consciousness of Germans and on audiences
watching worldwide. These and other moral urgencies and imperatives
would have been lost had Morgenthau's vision of summary executions
been undertaken.
And the overall range of responsibility was broadened as well.
Julius Streicher, a newspaper publisher, was convicted among the first
tier of Nuremberg defendants for disseminating propaganda against the
Jews. He was deemed just as complicit, murderous, and culpable in the
crimes of the Nazis as anyone who wore a uniform and carried a gun.
The lesson of how Streicher was treated in Nuremberg no doubt
influenced the recent convictions in the Rwandan tribunals of
defendants who owned a newspaper and controlled a radio station and
who fomented cold-blooded violence without ever having to lift a
machete.
Moreover, even the de-Nazification investigations of Wilhelm
Furtwangler, the legendary conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic
Orchestra, suggested that the moral vision of Nuremberg emanated
various values and spiritual concerns beyond the merely retributive and
prosecutorial. Although not a member of the Nazi party and someone
who otherwise assisted some of his Jewish musicians in fleeing
Germany, Furtwangler was nonetheless exposed to a protracted and
humiliating investigation, the result of which ended in an acquittal but
not without considerable damage to his legacy and reputation. Indeed,
he never recovered from the proceeding, and his musical career was
effectively over. Yet here was a man who was merely an artist, and not
an ideologue. He was harmlessly apolitical. All he cared about was the
preservation of German culture, even during a time of political
madness.
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But perhaps that's the point, at least the moral one. By continuing
to orchestrate music during the rampaging murders of the Nazis,
Furtwangler gave the Germans the spiritual resilience to go on, and the
music to murder by. He allowed the murderers and bystanders to purify
themselves each night with the sounds of lush German romanticism,
while corrupting themselves during the day with fully evolved displays
of German barbarism. Furtwangler merely lifted his baton, and yet he
was deemed morally instrumental and complicit in the Holocaust, even
if he was in no way the proximate cause. After Nuremberg, civilians,
and even artists, were deemed to have responsibilities under
international law.
The moral lessons of Nuremberg and its progeny are never-ending,
even if the architects of those lessons, especially the Americans, failed
to heed their own advice by not advancing the cause of moral justice at
home, and in failing to support future international tribunals. So,
instead, Nuremberg remains just a tease, a romantic glimpse of what can
happen when moral values completely override the soulless, mechanical
rigidity, and precedential obsessions, of cold, lifeless, black letter law.

